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Abstract
This study investigates how industries with different patterns of firm heterogene-
ity are distributed across countries by developing a three-sector general-equilibrium
model. There are two manufacturing industries in our setting: one in which firm
productivity is homogeneous and the other in which it is heterogeneous. The higher
degree of firm heterogeneity in the latter reflects the larger difference in firm het-
erogeneity between industries. We show that the larger country is more specialized
in the industry with heterogeneous (homogeneous) firms when trade costs are low
(high) and that an increase in the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity
fosters the larger country’s degree of specialization in the industry with heteroge-
neous firms. We also disclose the trade patterns across countries and show how
they respond to trade liberalization. Moreover, wages are found to be higher in the
larger country, with an increase in the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity
enlarging the wage inequality across countries.
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1 Introduction
In the past decade or so, an extensive established literature has analyzed the role of
firm heterogeneity in trade (Melitz 2003; Helpman et al. 2004; Bernard et al. 2007;
Melitz and Ottaviano 2008), economic geography (Baldwin and Okubo 2006; Nocke 2006;
Okubo et al. 2008), and production organization (Antra`s and Helpman 2004), enriching
our understanding of observed trade patterns, industrial agglomeration, spatial inequality,
and firm integration.
Most of these studies are based on a single industry framework (usually with a ho-
mogeneous goods sector) to make the models more tractable. A few studies such as
Bernard et al. (2007) have also considered the inter-industry trade, but they assume an
identical pattern of firm heterogeneity across industries. To the best of our knowledge,
little attention has thus far been paid to the fact that the degree of firm heterogeneity
differs (sometimes enormously) across industries. For instance, using micro panel data
for producers in seven two-digit manufacturing industries in South Korea and Taiwan,
Aw et al. (2003) find that the within-industry productivity dispersion across producers,
productivity differentials between surviving and failing producers, producer turnover, and
so on, differ among manufacturing industries and countries. Exploiting Italian firm-level
data, Gatto et al. (2008) also show that firm heterogeneity in productivity differs across
industries and that more open industries feature less dispersion among firms’ marginal
costs.
In this regard, it is natural to examine how industries differing in their patterns of firm
heterogeneity are distributed across countries during trade liberalization. Does country
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size matter? What are the roles of firm heterogeneity in industrial specialization and
trade patterns? In this study, we provide preliminary answers to these questions by
marrying the literature on inter-industry trade studies,1 usually assuming homogeneous
firm productivity, with that on the so-called ‘new’ New Economic Geography (NEG)
literature that sheds light on how firm heterogeneity affects the existence and intensity
of agglomeration economies (see Ottaviano (2011) for a review of this stream of the
literature).
We investigate how industries differing in their patterns of firm heterogeneity are
distributed across countries by developing a two-country three-sector general-equilibrium
model. The countries differ in market size, and there are one homogeneous goods sector
and two manufacturing sectors, which differ in firm heterogeneity. In particular, one of
the manufacturing industries is modeled with heterogeneous firms a` la Melitz (2003),
while the other one, to keep the model tractable, is modeled with homogeneous firms.
That is, the patterns of firm heterogeneity differ between the two manufacturing sectors.2
Workers are immobile across countries but can move freely across the sectors within a
country. Industrial agglomeration works via the entry and exit of firms stimulated by
labor mobility across sectors.
We show that the larger country is more specialized in the industry with heterogeneous
(homogeneous) firms when trade costs are low (high) and that an increase in the inter-
industry difference in firm heterogeneity further fosters the larger country’s specialization
1This body of the literature includes Amiti (1998), Laussel and Paul (2007), and Ricci (1999), to name
a few.
2Alternatively, we could assume that the firms in both manufacturing industries are heterogeneous in
productivity. However, this makes the model too heavy to provide any tractable results. By assuming
homogeneous firms in one of the manufacturing industries, this simply reflects the inter-industry difference
in firm heterogeneity and offers us more tractable results without losing many of the intuitive implications.
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degree in the industry with heterogeneous firms. Furthermore, our results suggest that the
larger country is a net exporter of both manufacturing industry goods when trade costs are
high and is a net exporter (importer) of the industrial goods produced by heterogeneous
(homogeneous) firms when trade costs are low. An increase in the inter-industry difference
in firm heterogeneity increases (decreases) the larger country’s net exports of the industrial
goods produced by heterogeneous (homogeneous) firms.
Our findings on industrial specialization and trade patterns are related to the results
presented by, for example, Amiti (1998) and Laussel and Paul (2007). Amiti (1998) finds
that the larger country specializes more in the production of high elasticity goods and,
hence, is a net exporter of high elasticity goods when trade costs are close to the levels of
autarky or free trade. In a single-factor model, Laussel and Paul (2007) demonstrate that
if the two countries have different market sizes and the demand elasticities differ across
industries, the larger country specializes in the production of high elasticity goods and
is always a net exporter of such high elasticity goods. However, their analyses rely on
the assumption of homogeneous firm productivity across industries, which is somewhat
unrealistic. Bernard et al. (2007) examine how comparative advantages, heterogeneous
firm productivity and falling trade costs interact and affect reallocations of resources both
within and across industries and countries. Although Bernard et al.’s model takes firm
heterogeneity into account as well, our study differs from theirs, as they neglect the inter-
industry difference in firm heterogeneity (in addition, they assume symmetric country
sizes).
Owing to the interplay of the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity and other
ingredients in traditional trade and NEG models (e.g., demand elasticity, country size, and
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transport costs), neglecting this point tends to cause inconsistency between the theoretical
predictions and empirical findings. That is, the assumption of an identical pattern of firm
productivity across industries is not innocuous in inter-industry trade studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 further discusses the
previous literature. Section 3 introduces the model setting. Section 4 solves the equi-
librium and Section 5 examines the wages, industrial specialization, and trade patterns.
The last section summarizes our main results and discusses some potential extensions.
2 Literature review
This section briefly describes the related literature on the approaches of inter-industry
trade studies and on ‘new’ NEG models.
Amiti (1998) theoretically examines the relationship between the size of a country and
characteristics of the goods it produces and trades. She builds a general-equilibrium model
with two countries differing only in size and two imperfectly competitive industries that
can differ in factor intensities, trade costs, and demand elasticities. Her results show that
industrial specialization and trade patterns largely depend on the interplay between the
market access effect and production cost effect. In contrast to the model of Amiti (1998)
with two factors, Laussel and Paul (2007) build a one-factor two-sector general-equilibrium
model and demonstrate that if the size of the two countries is different and demand
elasticities differ across industries, the larger country is always a net exporter of the less
differentiated goods. In a new trade theory framework, Ricci (1999) also investigates
the relationship between agglomeration and industrial specialization by building a two-
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country three-sector model encompassing Ricardian comparative advantage, monopolistic
competition, and trade costs. He shows that agglomeration in one country reduces its
specialization within the manufacturing industry. Nonetheless, all these studies assume
away firm heterogeneity in productivity and therefore fail to answer the aforementioned
questions.
In the ‘new’ NEG literature, a growing number of studies examine the location deci-
sions of heterogeneous firms or how firm heterogeneity alters existing results on agglomer-
ation. For instance, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) introduce firm heterogeneity a` la Melitz
(2003) into the footloose capital model (Martin and Rogers 1995) and show that firm het-
erogeneity leads to the sorting of the most productive firms into larger regions. Based on
the footloose capital model where the mobile factor repatriates all its earnings to its region
of origin, their approach does not exhibit demand-linked or cost-linked circular causality
as in the core-periphery model of Krugman (1991). Okubo (2009), by considering interme-
diate input linkages, further reveals that rather than catastrophic agglomeration, gradual
trade liberalization causes gradual agglomeration. Ehrlich and Seidel (2013) succeed in
introducing Melitz-type firm heterogeneity into the core-periphery model and shed light
on the role of firm heterogeneity in agglomeration. They show that an increase in firm
heterogeneity works in favor of agglomeration. By contrast, Zhou (2018) theoretically
demonstrates that an increase in firm heterogeneity enlarges the range of trade costs in
which dispersion is a stable equilibrium, by including Melitz-type firm heterogeneity into
the model proposed by Murata and Thisse (2005) with urban costs.
Among others, in a linear model, Okubo et al. (2010) assume two types of firm
productivities and investigate how heterogeneous firms respond to trade liberalization
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by choosing different locations. They uncover a bell-shaped relationship between trade
liberalization and the international productivity gap. Specifically, they show that high
productive firms are selected into the large market when trade costs fall; however, less
productive firms also find it profitable to be located in the large market if trade costs fall
further. By assuming two types of firm productivities, Saito et al. (2011) also disclose
that low productivity firms relocate away from the region in which high productivity
firms agglomerate during trade liberalization. Saito (2015) further examines the organi-
zation and location decisions of heterogeneous firms with multi-plant operations and the
implications for regional productivity.
Indeed, the extensive literature on ‘new’ NEG has greatly enriched our understanding
of the role of firm heterogeneity in economic agglomeration and regional development.
However, by examining only a single manufacturing industry, existing studies in this
strand of the literature are still inadequate for addressing the aforementioned questions.3
3 The model
We consider an economy involving two countries j ∈ {h, f}, two increasing returns to
scale (IRS) sectors v ∈ {1, 2}, each producing differentiated varieties (of goods 1 and 2,
respectively), and one constant returns to scale (CRS) sector producing a homogeneous
commodity (A). The economy is endowed with a unit mass of skilled workers and L units
of unskilled workers, each supplying one unit of labor inelastically.4 Both types of workers
3While Forslid and Okubo (2014) consider the multi-industry case, however, their analysis focuses
on regional firm sorting rather than industrial specialization and trade patterns. Moreover, they do not
exploit the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity.
4Without loss of generality, the number of skilled workers is normalized to one for simplicity.
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are mobile across sectors but immobile across countries. Let λ denote the proportion of
skilled workers residing in country h, so that the mass of skilled workers in country f is
given by 1−λ. To rule out the Heckscher–Ohlin advantages, the share of unskilled workers
in country h is given by λ as well. Without loss of generality, country h is assumed to
be the larger one, namely λ ∈ (1/2, 1). In the following analysis, we mainly describe the
economy in country h for simplicity, as that in country f is almost symmetric.
3.1 Consumption
Preferences are identical across consumers and each consumer in country h maximizes the
CES utility function given by
Uh = C
αβ
1h C
α(1−β)
2h C
1−α
Ah , 0 < β < 1, 0 ≤ 2α < 1, (1)
with
C1h =
(
Ω1∑
i=1
c
(σ−1)/σ
1hi
)σ/(σ−1)
and C2h =
(
Ω2∑
i=1
c
(σ−1)/σ
2hi
)σ/(σ−1)
,
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among the varieties of the same goods, α is
the share of expenditure on the two differentiated goods,5 of which β is allocated to good
1 and 1 − β to good 2. Ω1 and Ω2 are the number of differentiated varieties for the two
IRS industries available in country h, respectively. Maximizing the utilities, total demand
for differentiated goods i in country h is derived as
5We set the expenditure share on IRS goods to be less than half to keep the A goods produced in
both countries and maintain nominal wage equalization. See Baldwin and Krugman (2004, footnote 5)
for more details. Further, as argued by Ricci (1999), such an assumption is clearly technical, but not too
implausible: in most countries, the share of manufacturing in GDP does not exceed half.
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d1h(i) =
p1h(i)
−σ
P 1−σ1h
Yhαβ, d2h(i) =
p2h(i)
−σ
P 1−σ2h
Yhα(1− β), (2)
where p1h(i) and p2h(i) are the consumer prices for variety i, and P1h ≡ (
∫
i∈Ω1 p1h(i)
1−σdi)
1
1−σ
and P2h ≡ (
∫
i∈Ω2 p2h(i)
1−σdi)
1
1−σ denotes the price indices. Yh = Lλwˆ+λwh is the national
income of country h in which wˆ and wh are the wages of unskilled and skilled workers,
respectively.
3.2 Production and technology
Following Helpman and Krugman (1985), the homogeneous goods sector is subject to
CRS, perfect competition, and free trade. One unskilled worker is employed to produce
one unit of the homogeneous goods. By choosing the homogeneous goods as the numeraire,
the wages of unskilled labor in the two countries are pinned down to wˆ = 1. The two
manufacturing industries are subject to Dixit–Stiglitz monopolistic competition and each
variety of the differentiated goods is produced by a single firm under internal IRS. When
a differentiated goods is shipped across countries, transport costs a` la Samuelson (1954)
occur: τ > 1 units of the variety must be sent from the origin for one unit to arrive at
the destination.
3.2.1 Industry 1 with heterogeneous firms
We follow Melitz (2003) by assuming that firms in Industry 1 differ in productivity ϕ,
which is drawn from a commonly known distribution function. Firms do not know their
productivity ex ante; to obtain this information, they have to incur an investment (e.g.,
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R&D). We denote this entry cost in terms of skilled labor, namely fewh. Based on
this knowledge, a firm decides whether to start production or exit the industry if its
productivity is too low to generate a profit. After that, for xi units of output of variety
i, each firm has a specific input requirement according to xi(ϕ) = hi(ϕ)ϕ, where hi(ϕ)
denotes the marginal unskilled labor input subject to productivity ϕ. As in Melitz (2003),
firms are heterogeneous w.r.t. their productivities whereas workers have the same skills.
This can be rationalized by arguing that each firm possesses a specific technology, which
in turn determines the labor productivity of its employees.
Moreover, to serve the local market, a firm is required to invest f units of skilled labor
as a fixed input. This investment could take the form of, say, an equipment purchase or
marketing activities that are independent of variable costs. A similar argument applies
for the export market, as firms have to hire an additional fx units of skilled labor to sell
to overseas consumers.
Under Dixit–Stiglitz preferences, firms maximize their profits by choosing the optimal
price. For domestic sales and exports, the consumer prices of variety i are derived as
p1hh(i) = σwˆ/(σ − 1)ϕ and p1hf (i) = στwˆ/(σ − 1)ϕ, respectively. Together with the
demand function (2), the revenue and profit of a representative firm in country h are
R1h(ϕ) =
p1hh(ϕ)
1−σ
P 1−σ1h
Yhαβ, R1hx(ϕ) =
p1hf (ϕ)
1−σ
P 1−σ1f
Yfαβ,
pi1h(ϕ) = R1h(ϕ)/σ − fwh, pi1hx(ϕ) = R1hx(ϕ)/σ − fxwh,
where R1h (pi1h) is the revenue (profit) from the domestic market and R1hx (pi1hx) is that
from the foreign market. Firms with higher productivity (higher ϕ) charge lower prices,
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sell more, and earn higher profits.
We follow the literature on heterogeneous firms in assuming Pareto-distributed pro-
ductivity levels. Hence, the cumulative distribution function reads G(ϕ) = 1−ϕ−k, where
k > 0 denotes the shape parameter. To simplify the notation, as in Ehrlich and Seidel
(2013, 2015), we normalize the scale parameter to unity without loss of generality. This
means that ϕ = 1 is the lowest productivity a firm will achieve. As noted by Ehrlich and
Seidel (2013, 2015), the Pareto distribution offers the advantage that the shape parameter
k is a straightforward measure of the heterogeneity of firms. The variance of the Pareto
distribution V ar(ϕ) = k/[(k − 1)2(k − 2)] is strictly decreasing in k for k > 2.6 A high
value of k implies that it becomes less likely to draw a high productivity level ϕ. In other
words, only a few firms are highly productive and the number of low-productivity firms
is high. In the extreme case of k = ∞, all firms are clustered at the lower bound (i.e.,
ϕ = 1). By contrast, a lower value of k implies a more heterogeneous distribution of
productivity levels.
3.2.2 Industry 2 with homogeneous firms
In Industry 2, we assume all firms are homogeneous in productivity by setting k = ∞.
In this way, a change in k in Industry 1 reflects not only a change in the degree of firm
heterogeneity in this industry, but also the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity
between the two manufacturing sectors. This simplified setting allows us to provide more
tractable results without losing intuitive insights and implications.7
6Assuming k > 2 is necessary to ensure the Pareto distribution has finite variance. See also Helpman
et al. (2004). Meanwhile, as in the literature, we impose k > σ − 1 to ensure that the integrals of the
average productivity of the Pareto distribution converge.
7Alternatively, we could also assume a normal k in Industry 2; however, this makes the model too
complicated to provide any tractable results. It also becomes difficult to capture how a change in the
11
By choosing units of the product, one skilled worker is employed for start-up and
(σ − 1)/σ units of unskilled labor are required to produce one unit of the product. The
profit of a representative firm in Industry 2 is then given as
pi2h(i) =
(
p2h(i)− σ − 1
σ
wˆ
)
(d2hh(i) + τd2hf (i))− wh.
The F.O.C. gives the optimal price of variety i as p2hh(i) = wˆ and p2hf (i) = τwˆ. Free
entry and exit ensure zero profit of firms in the industry.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Equilibrium of Industry 1 with heterogeneous firms
Firms in Industry 1 first decide whether to enter the industry until their expected profits
can offset the entry costs. Based on their productivity draw, firms start producing as long
as their profits are not negative; this applies to all firms with a level of productivity level
ϕ that exceeds the cutoff level ϕ∗. Moreover, a subset of these domestically active firms
with higher productivity may find it profitable to export to the foreign market.
To solve the equilibrium, we combine the free-entry condition with the zero-cutoff-profit
condition to derive the domestic cutoff productivity level ϕ∗. Firms enter the industry as
long as the expected profits (from both domestic sales and exports) are sufficient to cover
inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity affects industrial specialization and trade patterns. By
contrast, by assuming homogeneous firms in Industry 2, it serves as a benchmark case, which provides
us more tractable results as well as insights into how the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity
affects specialization and trade patterns across countries during trade liberalization.
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the fixed market entry costs. Formally, this free-entry condition for country h is given by
(ϕ∗h)
−kp˜i1h = fewh, (3)
where p˜i1h denotes the average profits of surviving firms. Multiplied by the probability of
surviving in the competitive market (i.e., (ϕ∗h)
−k), we obtain the expected profits before
firm-specific productivity levels have been realized.
Surviving firms expect to earn pi1h(ϕ˜h) domestically and (ϕ
∗
h/ϕ
∗
hx)
kpi1hx(ϕ˜hx) from ex-
ports, where ϕ˜h and ϕ˜hx denote the average productivity levels of domestic and exporting
firms, respectively. Here, (ϕ∗h/ϕ
∗
hx)
k reflects the probability of becoming an exporter con-
ditional on being active in the domestic market, with ϕ∗hx denoting the cutoff productivity
for exporting. Firms will only start producing for the domestic and export market as long
as their revenue from the respective market covers the market-specific fixed costs. As a re-
sult, the marginal domestic and exporting firm will be formally given by R1h(ϕ
∗
h) = σfwh
and R1hx(ϕ
∗
hx) = σfxwh. These two conditions can be used together with R1fx(ϕ
∗
fx) to
establish the link between the domestic cutoff in country h and exporter cutoff in country
f :
ϕ∗fx = τ
(
fx
f
wf
wh
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗h. (4)
As in the literature, we assume fx > f , which reflects the reality that domestic sales
are generally more profitable than exporting. This common assumption in the literature
is used to avoid the case that a exporting firm does not serve local consumers.8 Based
8If wh = wf , we have ϕ
∗
h = ϕ
∗
f such that ϕ
∗
fx > ϕ
∗
h implies ϕ
∗
fx > ϕ
∗
f , whereas ϕ
∗
hx > ϕ
∗
f implies
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on these insights, it is evident that the conditional export probability is limited to the
range between zero and unity. Intuitively, a lower level of the shape parameter k (more
heterogeneous in productivity) implies a higher export probability. Using Eq. (4), we can
formulate the conditional export probability as
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗hx
)k
= τ−k
(
fx
f
wh
wf
) k
1−σ
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗f
)k
. (5)
Then, we can formulate average revenue in terms of the cutoff productivities, R˜1h(ϕ˜h) =(
ϕ˜h
ϕ∗h
)σ−1
R1h(ϕ
∗
h). By combining the profits from domestic and export sales with the con-
ditional export probability in Eq. (5), the zero-cutoff-profit condition can be derived
as
p˜i1h =
(
ϕ˜h
ϕ∗h
)σ−1
fwh − fwh +
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗hx
)k [(
ϕ˜hx
ϕ∗hx
)σ−1
fxwh − fxwh
]
, (6)
where the first two terms on the RHS are domestic profit, whereas the third one is
profit from the export market. A Pareto distribution of productivity implies that av-
erage productivity results as a constant markup on the respective cutoff levels, that is
ϕ˜h/ϕ
∗
h = ϕ˜hx/ϕ
∗
hx = [k/(k − σ + 1)]1/(σ−1), which helps simplify the mathematical ex-
pressions.9 Then, we can solve the domestic cutoff level of productivity in country h by
combining Eqs. (3) and (6):
ϕ∗h =
[
σ − 1
(fe/f)(k − σ + 1)
1−H2τ−k
1−H(wf/wh) kσ−1
]1/k
, (7)
ϕ∗hx > ϕ
∗
h, which ensures that exporting firms also serve the domestic market. If wh 6= wf , we show
ϕ∗hx > ϕ
∗
f > ϕ
∗
h and provide the necessary and sufficient conditions of ϕ
∗
fx > ϕ
∗
f in the Online Appendix.
9Please see Ehrlich and Seidel (2013, p. 542; 2015, footnote 14).
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where H ≡ (fx/f)
k−σ+1
1−σ ∈ (0, 1). This shows that the country with higher wages features
lower cutoff productivity because higher wages reduce expected profits and result in less
entry. This is consistent with the theoretical results proposed by Ehrlich and Seidel (2013)
and Zhou (2018) as well as the empirical findings of Chen and Moore (2010).10 Moreover,
total expenditure in the domestic and foreign markets equals total revenue, which implies
Yhαβ = n1h
(
ϕ˜h
ϕ∗h
)σ−1
σfwh + n1f
(
ϕ∗f
ϕ∗fx
)k(
ϕ˜fx
ϕ∗fx
)σ−1
σfxwf , (8)
where n1j is the number of active firms in country j. The LHS is the total expenditure
in Industry 1 goods, while the RHS shows the revenue of domestic and foreign firms.
4.2 Equilibrium of Industry 2 with homogeneous firms
For a typical firm in Industry 2, free entry and exit ensures zero profit, and the payment
to fixed input equals 1/σ share of the total revenue in equilibrium a` la Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). Using Eq. (2), we thus have
σwh =
(
p1−σ2hh Yh
P 1−σ2h
+ φ
p1−σ2hh Yf
P 1−σ2f
)
α(1− β), (9)
where φ ≡ τ 1−σ ∈ (0, 1) denotes trade freeness. Finally, skilled workers are fully employed
in the two differentiated goods sectors. The labor market-clearing condition of country h
10Based on a firm-level data for French multinational companies, Chen and Moore (2010) find that
firms investing in less populous markets are on average more efficient. Both the cutoff and average total
factor productivity are negatively correlated with the host country’s market potential.
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can be formulated as
λ = n1hf +
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗hx
)k
n1hfx + (ϕ
∗
h)
kn1hfe + n2h, (10)
where the LHS is the skilled labor supply and the four terms on the RHS represent the
amount of skilled labor employed in domestic production, export, fixed entry costs, and
Industry 2, respectively. For Eqs. (8), (9), and (10), mirror expressions exist for country
f , and we thus have six equations that endogenously determine the following six variables:
wh, wf , n1h, n2h, n1f , and n2f .
5 Wages, industrial specialization, and trade patterns
This section analytically investigates wages, industrial specialization, and trade patterns
in the equilibrium. Although closed-form solutions of the endogenous variables are not
fully available, we are able to provide some tractable results and further confirm them
by carrying out numerical experiments. We first exploit the impact of the inter-industry
difference in firm heterogeneity as well as market size and trade liberalization on the wage
inequality across countries. After establishing a theoretical foundation, we turn to analyze
industrial specialization and trade patterns.
5.1 Home Market Effect (HME) in terms of wages
Proposition 1 The wages in the larger country are higher than those in the smaller
country in both the interior and the corner equilibria. An increase in the inter-industry
difference in firm heterogeneity enlarges the wage inequality across countries when trade
16
costs are close to the level of autarky.
Proof: See Appendix A.
This shows that the wages in the larger country are higher, which was first addressed by
Krugman (1980) with an intra-industry trade model and further confirmed by Takahashi
et al. (2013), Mossay and Tabuchi (2015), and Zhou (2019). In particular, this was
termed the “HME in terms of wages” by Takahashi et al. (2013), and was also confirmed
in inter-industry trade studies (e.g., Amiti 1998; Laussel and Paul 2007).11 Empirically,
evidence on the role of market access in determining factor prices is found by Breinlich
(2006) and Head and Mayer (2006, 2011) and summarized in Redding (2013).12
Intuitively, in countries with better market access, more value-added remains after
deducting trade costs to remunerate factors of production, which results in higher nominal
wages in the equilibrium.
Our analysis adds to these related results by generalizing the results to a multi-sector
model with an inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity. Moreover, in contrast to
previous studies, we find that an increase in the inter-industry difference in firm hetero-
geneity enlarges the wage inequality across countries if trade costs are sufficiently high.
This finding is confirmed by our numerical experiments as well. Fig. (1) shows the re-
lationship between the wage differential, wh/wf , and trade freeness φ, given σ = 3 and
λ = 0.7. It illustrates that an increase in the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity
11Amiti (1998) generalizes the wage advantages of the larger market to the two-industry case, which
allows for industrial differences in factor intensity, the elasticity of substitution, and transport costs.
Her findings on wage advantages are further confirmed by Laussel and Paul (2007) in a two-industry
one-factor model. They extend the results by showing that the relative wage rate of the larger country
is an overall increasing function of its market size.
12Breinlich (2006) and Head and Mayer (2006) find that wages increase with market access using EU
data and exploiting both cross-sectional and time-series variation. Head and Mayer (2011) also confirm
the strong correlation between changes in income and changes in market access by exploiting a country-
level panel dataset.
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(i.e., fall in k) enlarges wh/wf .
Since a growing stream of empirical studies has shown that firm heterogeneity in
productivity exerts significant impacts on wage rates in addition to industrial locations
and trade patterns (Aw et al. 2003; Aw and Lee 2008; Chen and Moore 2010), our
analysis partly consolidates the theoretical foundation of the HME to a certain extent,
making it more compatible with micro-level empirical analysis.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Φ
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
whw f
Figure 1: Wage differential w.r.t. φ. Solid: k = 6, Dotted: k = 4, DotDashed: k=3
The mechanisms under which firm heterogeneity in productivity affects the wage in-
equality across countries could be manifold, among which the following is particularly
relevant. A smaller k implies that a firm in Industry 1 is more likely to draw a high
productivity level, which leads to more efficient competitors. Accordingly, the least pro-
ductive firms are forced to exit and a higher share of firms that survive find it profitable to
enter the export market. Although the conditional export probability,
(
ϕ∗j
ϕ∗jx
)k
, is higher
in the smaller country,13 the number of new exporters increases more in the larger country
because of its market size advantage.
13Using Eq. (7), we have
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗hx
)k
<
(
ϕ∗f
ϕ∗fx
)k
, where the inequality stems from wh/wf > 1.
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This is illustrated more intuitively by a numerical experiment, as shown in Fig. (2);
the columns show the cases of a given φ and a changing σ, while the rows show the
situations of a given σ and a changing φ. We find that the value of k falls, the number of
exporters in the larger country increases relatively more than that in the smaller country.
As a result, firms in the larger country sell more (than their counterparts) to the foreign
market, which raises revenue and wages in Industry 1 in the larger country. Owing to the
higher wage rate in Industry 1, workers in the larger country move from Industry 2 into
Industry 1; this will be discussed in the next subsection.
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Figure 2: The relative number of exporters, nhx/nfx, w.r.t. k.
In addition, as shown in Fig. (1), the wage differential exerts bell-shaped pattern
during trade liberalization.14 Intuitively, owing to the market size advantage, firms in the
larger country sell more and pay higher wages when trade costs are relatively high. As
trade costs fall during economic integration, the market size advantage attenuates and
14Appendix A analytically derives
∂(wh/wf )
∂φ
∣∣
φ=0
> 0 and
∂(wh/wf )
∂φ
∣∣
φ=1
< 0. For intermediate values of
trade freeness, the related results are shown by numerical experiments.
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the disadvantage of higher labor costs begins to take the upper hand. As a result, firms
in the larger market reduce the wage rate to sustain production, which results in the
bell-shaped wage differential during trade liberalization. This result is consistent with
that of inter-industry trade models (e.g., Amiti 1998) and single-industry studies (e.g.,
Takahashi et al. 2013; Zhou 2019).15
5.2 Sectoral agglomeration and industrial specialization
Following Ricci (1999), sectoral agglomeration is defined as
ηvh ≡ nvh
nvh + nvf
, 0 ≤ ηvh ≤ 1, ηvh + ηvf = 1, ∀v = 1, 2.
Although the closed-form solutions of ηvh and ηvf are not available, we still obtain several
tractable results.
Proposition 2 In autarky, the degree of sectoral agglomeration η1h is equal to the larger
country’s market size share λ. As trade costs fall, there exists a φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) at which
η1h = λ. We have η1h < λ when φ is close to zero and η1h > λ when φ is close to one.
Meanwhile, there exists a φ† ∈ (0, 1) at which η2h = λ. We have η2h > λ when φ is
close to zero and η2h < λ when φ is close to one. Moreover, a fall in k increases η1h and
decreases η2h when φ is close to zero or one.
Proof: See Appendix B.
15Theoretical support for the bell-shaped pattern of spatial inequality is mostly based on industrial
location (e.g., Krugman and Venables 1995; Venables 1996; Puga and Venables 1997). Spatial inequality
in wages is theoretically investigated by Amiti (1998), Takahashi et al. (2013), and Zhou (2019).
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In autarky, two countries are isolated from each other, and the larger country is just
a scale expansion of the smaller country. The inference on sectoral agglomeration is thus
straightforward.
As trade costs decline from the level in autarky, firms in both industries begin to enter
the export market. When trade costs are still relatively high, the firms in Industry 2 in
the larger country enjoy the advantage of market size; they sell more in a larger domestic
market that is free of trade cost (the market access effect). Consequently, the increase in
factor demand bids up the wages in Industry 2. Meanwhile, the firms in Industry 1 in
the larger country face high export barriers. Although they enjoy a larger local market
as well, their average firm productivity is lower than their counterparts in the smaller
country.16 The domestic market in Industry 1 in the larger country is gradually invaded
by the more competitive competitors from the smaller country. Hence, the revenue in
Industry 1 falls and workers in Industry 1 flow out to Industry 2. The degree of sectoral
agglomeration in Industry 1 (η1h) thus decreases, while η2h increases, when trade costs
are still at relatively high levels, as illustrated in Fig. (3).
Η1 h
Η2 h
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Φ
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0.85
Η1 h,Η2 h
Figure 3: η1h and η2h w.r.t. φ. Solid: k = 6, Dotted: k = 4, Dashed: k = 3.
16This is because ϕ∗h is lower than ϕ
∗
f , as shown by Eq. (7) and ϕ˜h/ϕ
∗
h = ϕ˜f/ϕ
∗
f = [k/(k−σ+1)]1/(σ−1).
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As trade liberalization advances further (i.e., trade costs reach a relatively low level),
the market access effect attenuates; on the contrary, the disadvantage of higher labor
costs begins to take the upper hand. The firms in Industry 2 in country h sell less than
before, which, in turn, reduces the wages in this industry. Meanwhile, the firms in Indus-
try 1 face much lower export barriers than before. Some firms that were not sufficiently
productive to export begin to enter the export market. Although the conditional export
probability is still lower in the larger country than in the smaller country, the number of
new exporters increases more owing to the size advantage. Hence, revenue in Industry 1
gradually increases, bidding up the wages in the industry. Consequently, workers move
from Industry 2 to Industry 1. As illustrated in Fig. (3), the degree of sectoral agglom-
eration η1h increases and exceeds λ, while η2h decreases, as trade liberalization proceeds
further to a low level of trade costs.
Furthermore, our analytical results show how a change in the inter-industry difference
in firm heterogeneity (i.e., change in k) affects industrial specialization across countries.
A fall in k increases the agglomeration degree in Industry 1 and decreases that in Industry
2 in the larger country if the trade costs are close to the level of autarky or free trade. Our
numerical experiments, as shown in Fig. (3), also confirm this trend. Intuitively, a smaller
k implies that a firm in Industry 1 is more likely to draw a high productivity level, which
leads to more efficient competitors. Accordingly, a higher share of firms that survive in
the productivity draw find it profitable to enter the export market. As explained above,
the number of new exporters then increases relatively more in the larger country because
of its larger market size. Hence, firms in Industry 1 have higher revenue than before,
which bids up wages in the industry. As a result, workers in the larger country move from
22
Industry 2 into Industry 1, which fosters the agglomeration of Industry 1 in the larger
country.
Following Ricci (1999), we measure specialization using the level of industrial agglom-
eration. Specifically, the degree of national specialization in Industry v (Svj) is measured
as
S1h ≡ η1h
η2h
, S2h ≡ η2h
η1h
, S1f ≡ η1f
η2f
, S2f ≡ η2f
η1f
.
Country j is more specialized in Industry v if Svj > 1. According to the definition of
ηvh, S1h > 1 implies S2f > 1 simultaneously. That is, if country h is more specialized in
Industry 1, then country f is more specialized in Industry 2 and vice versa.
Proposition 3 The larger country is more specialized in the industry with homogeneous
firms when trade costs are close to the level of autarky and is more specialized in the
industry with heterogeneous firms when trade costs are close to the level of free trade. An
increase in the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity increases the larger country’s
degree of specialization in the industry with heterogeneous firms when trade costs are close
to the level of autarky or free trade.
Proof: From the definition of Svj and Proposition 2, the results above are straightforward.

Our result indicates that the smaller country is more specialized in the industry with
heterogeneous firms when trade costs are high. This supports the empirical findings
of Chen and Moore (2010) using French multinational firm-level data. They find that in
countries with below-average market potential, the productivity distribution of firms first-
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order stochastically dominates those in countries with above-average market potential.17
Moreover, we complement their results by predicting that if trade liberalization proceeds
further, the export barriers for firms in the larger market decrease, and a larger proportion
of firms in the larger market can penetrate the foreign market. This increases revenue,
bids up wages, and encourages the larger country’s degree of specialization in Industry 1.
Moreover, our results suggest that the assumption of homogeneous firm productivity
across industries (e.g., Amiti 1998; Laussel and Paul 2007) may not be innocuous in inter-
industry trade studies. Indeed, the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity does
have significant impacts on wages, sectoral agglomeration, and industrial specialization.
5.3 Trade patterns
This section examines the trade patterns across countries during trade liberalization, and
particularly how the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity affects those trade
patterns. The net exports of the two types of industrial goods in country h are derived
respectively as
EX1(φ) ≡ n1h
(
ϕ∗1h
ϕ∗1hx
)k (
ϕ˜1hx
ϕ∗1hx
)σ−1
σfxwh − n1f
(
ϕ∗1f
ϕ∗1fx
)k(
ϕ˜1fx
ϕ∗1fx
)σ−1
σfxwf , (11)
EX2(φ) ≡ n2hφ p
1−σ
2hh
P 1−σ2f
Yfα(1− β)− n2fφ
p1−σ2ff
P 1−σ2h
Yhα(1− β), (12)
in which the LHSs are total exports, while the RHSs are total imports, both measured in
numeraire units. Since there are only two countries, the larger country is a net exporter
of one good if and only if the smaller country is a net importer of that good.
17In the extreme case of k =∞, all the firms in Industry 2 cluster at the lower bound ϕ = 1, which is
the lowest productivity a firm can draw.
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Proposition 4 The larger country is a net exporter of both industrial goods when trade
costs are high and is a net exporter (importer) of the industrial goods produced by hetero-
geneous (homogeneous) firms when trade costs are low. An increase in the inter-industry
difference in firm heterogeneity increases (decreases) the larger country’s net exports of
the goods produced by heterogeneous (homogeneous) firms when trade costs are close to
the level of autarky or free trade.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The larger country is relatively more specialized in the production of Industry 2 goods
when trade costs are high, as shown in Proposition 3, and, naturally, it becomes a net
exporter of Industry 2 goods. In addition, Proposition 3 shows that the degree of sectoral
agglomeration (η1h) is less than the demand share (λ) in the larger country when trade
costs are high. However, the results here show that the larger country is also a net
exporter of Industry 1 goods, as illustrated in Fig. (4). Intuitively, this pattern can be
explained by the following points. First, firms in the larger country are relatively more
shielded from their more competitive foreign counterparts when trade costs are high and
imports are less. Second, although the conditional export probability in the larger country
is lower, the absolute number of exporters could be higher because of its size advantage.
Third, net exports here are measured in numeraire units and, therefore, the export values
are higher for firms with higher wages and lower productivity. When the larger country
is a net exporter of both industrial goods, trade is balanced by the net imports of the
homogeneous goods.
As trade liberalization proceeds further (i.e., trade costs reach a relatively low level),
the larger country becomes more specialized in Industry 1. In this scenario, it is straight-
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Figure 4: The net exports of country h, EXvh, w.r.t. φ. Solid: k=6, Dotted: k=4,
Dashed: k=3.
forward to find that the larger country is a net exporter (importer) of Industry 1 (2) goods.
Moreover, as shown by Propositions 2 and 3, an increase in the inter-industry difference
in firm heterogeneity (a fall in k) fosters the larger country’s degree of specialization in
Industry 1. As a result, the larger country produces more Industry 1 goods and thus ex-
ports more. This is also illustrated in Fig. (4): a fall in k increases (decreases) the larger
country’s net exports of the industrial goods produced by heterogeneous (homogeneous)
firms. Our results on trade patterns are thus in contrast to those of Amiti (1998) and
Laussel and Paul (2007), who assume homogeneous firm productivity across industries.18
To sum up, consistent with our analyses on wages and specialization, we find that the
inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity has significant impacts on trade patterns
as well. The current study therefore implies that exploring the inter-industry difference
in firm heterogeneity and its impacts on related issues enriches our understanding of the
modern spatial economy with dynamics in firm productivity. Further, neglecting this
point is likely to lead to a disagreement between the theoretical predictions and empirical
18Amiti (1998) finds that the larger country has positive net exports of high elasticity goods when
trade costs are close to the level of free trade or autarky; it is a net importer of high elasticity goods at
intermediate levels of trade costs. In a one-factor two-sector model, Laussel an Paul (2007) show that
if the two countries are very different in size and demand elasticities differ across industries, the larger
country is always a net exporter of the less differentiated goods.
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findings.
6 Concluding remarks
Our main results may be summarized as follows. First, wages in the larger country
are higher than those in the smaller country. The wage differential has a bell-shaped
pattern during trade liberalization. An increase in the inter-industry difference in firm
heterogeneity enlarges the wage inequality across countries. Second, the larger country is
more specialized in the industry with homogeneous (heterogeneous) firms when trade costs
are high (low). An increase in the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity increases
(decreases) the larger country’s specialization degree in the industry with heterogeneous
(homogeneous) firms. Third, the larger country is a net exporter of both industrial goods
when trade costs are relatively high and is a net exporter (importer) of the industrial goods
produced by heterogeneous (homogeneous) firms when trade costs are low. An increase in
the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity increases (decreases) the larger country’s
net exports of the industrial goods produced by heterogeneous (homogeneous) firms.
Our study contributes to the literature by disclosing how countries with different
market sizes specialize in industries with different degrees of firm heterogeneity during
trade liberalization. We also provide implications on how a change in the inter-industry
difference in firm heterogeneity affects wage inequality, industrial specialization, and trade
patterns. Our results indicate that the assumption of identical firm productivity across
industries in related theoretical studies is likely to be not innocuous. Hence, the current
study provides a theoretical foundation for future empirical research that aims to explore
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the dynamics of firms and industries in the context of globalization further.
Our framework suffers from some drawbacks. First, several results are tractable only
when trade costs are close to the level of autarky or free trade. For intermediate levels
of trade costs, our analyses still rely on numerical simulations. Extending our settings to
a linear framework with firm heterogeneity (e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) may derive
more tractable results and could allow for the robustness of our findings to be examined.
This remains a task for future research. Second, our setting includes two manufacturing
industries: one with heterogeneous firms and the other with homogeneous firms. Although
this strategy helps simplify the mathematics and can still provide insights into the role
of the inter-industry difference in firm heterogeneity in determining wages, industrial
specialization, and trade patterns, it makes our assumptions less realistic. Extending
our settings to two manufacturing industries that are both heterogeneous in productivity
and are different in the degrees of firm heterogeneity may help us better understand the
underlying mechanisms.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
We first consider the interior equilibrium with n1j > 0 and n2j > 0. For Eqs. (8), (9),
(10), mirror expressions exist for country f , which are respectively given as
Yfαβ = n1f
(
ϕ˜f
ϕ∗f
)σ−1
σfwf + n1h
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗fx
)k(
ϕ˜fx
ϕ∗fx
)σ−1
σfxwh, (A1)
σwf =
(
p1−σ2ff Yf
P 1−σ2f
+ φ
p1−σ2ff Yh
P 1−σ2h
)
α(1− β), (A2)
1− λ = n1ff +
(
ϕ∗f
ϕ∗fx
)k
n1ffx + (ϕ
∗
f )
kn1ffe + n2f . (A3)
By plugging Eqs. (4) - (6) into Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A1) - (A3), the six variables n1h, n1f ,
n2h, n2f , wh and wf are endogenously determined by the six equations. Suppose wh = wf
for φ ∈ (0, 1), Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A1) - (A3) solve
n2h = −
(
Hφ k−σ+1σ−1
1−Hφ k−σ+1σ−1
)
[λ− (1− λ)φ] < 0,
which contradicts with n2h > 0. Therefore, we have wh 6= wf for φ ∈ (0, 1) in the interior
equilibrium. On the other hand, at φ = 0, Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A1) - (A3) uniquely solve
wh = wf =
Lα
σ − α, n1h =
βλ(k − σ + 1)
fk
, n2h = λ(1− β), (A4)
n1f =
β(1− λ)(k − σ + 1)
fk
, n2f = (1− β)(1− λ). (A5)
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By total differentiating Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A1) - (A3) w.r.t. φ, the derivatives of wj
w.r.t. φ, when φ is close to zero, are derived as
∂wh
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ→0
=
Lασ(1− β)(2λ− 1)
λ(σ − α)2 > 0,
∂wf
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ→0
= −Lασ(1− β)(2λ− 1)
(1− λ)(σ − α)2 < 0. (A6)
Using Eqs. (A4), (A6), we derive
∂(wh/wf )
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ→0
=
σ(2λ− 1)(1− β)
λ(1− λ)(σ − α) > 0.
Therefore, at φ close to zero, we have wh > wf . Together with the result above, because
of the continuity, we have wh > wf for φ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, at φ close to zero, we
derive
∂(wh/wf )
∂k
∣∣∣∣
φ→0
=
−βσ(2λ− 1)Hφ kσ−1
kλ(1− λ)(σ − α) < 0,
which implies that a smaller k brings to a higher wh/wf when φ is close to zero. Meanwhile,
at φ = 1, total differentiating Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A1) - (A3) w.r.t. φ yields
∂(wh/wf )
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ=1
= −(2λ− 1) < 0.
It implies that wh/wf increases with φ at φ close to 0, and decreases with φ at φ close to
1.
We then consider the case of corner equilibrium.19 Denote the threshold value of trade
freeness at which n1f = 0 by φ
]. For φ ∈ (φ], 1), we have n1f = 0, n1h > 0 and n2j > 0.
Suppose wh = wf ≡ w when φ ∈ (φ], 1). Plugging n1f = 0 and Eq. (A3) into Eqs. (9)
19The possibilities of corner equilibria are examined in Online Appendix.
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and (A2) solves
n2h =
(1− λ)[λ− (1− λ)φ]
1− λ− λφ and w =
Lα(1− β)(1− λ− λφ)
σ[1− λ− (1− λ)φ]− α(1− β)(1− λ− λφ) .
(A7)
Meanwhile, Eqs. (8), (10), (A1) together give
G ≡ (L+ w)αβ
1 + λ(σ − 1)
(
1 +Hφ kσ−1
)
k − σ + 1
+ (n2h − λ)( k
k − σ + 1
)
σw = 0.
By plugging (A7) into G, we have
G > α
(1− λ)(1− φ)
{
kφ(2λ− 1)− β [(1− λ)2(σ − 1)(1− φ)− k(1− λ− λφ)]} > 0,
where the second inequality comes from the monotonicity of β. Note that if (1− λ)2(σ−
1)(1 − φ) − k(1 − λ − λφ) > 0, at β = 1, we have G > α[k − (1 − λ)(σ − 1)] > 0. It
contradicts with G = 0, and we therefore have wh 6= wf for φ ∈ (φ], 1).
On the other hand, at φ = 1, Eqs. (9) and (A2) together give wh = wf . By plugging
n1f = 0 and wh = wf into Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A1) - (A3), we solve n2f = 1− λ and
wh = wf =
Lα[k + β(σ − 1)(λH− 1 + λ)]
kσ − α[k + β(σ − 1)(λH− 1 + λ)] , (A8)
n2h =
k(1− β)
k + β(σ − 1)(λH− 1 + λ) − (1− λ), n1h =
βλ(k − σ + 1)
f [k + β(Hλ− 1 + λ)(σ − 1)] .
(A9)
Total differentiating Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A2) - (A3) w.r.t. wh, wf and φ at φ = 1 and
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plugging Eqs. (A8) into it, we derive
∂(wh/wf )
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ=1
= −(2λ− 1) < 0,
which implies that wh > wf when φ is close to 1. Together with the result that wh 6= wf
for φ ∈ (φ], 1), due to the continuity, we know wh > wf when φ ∈ (φ], 1) in the corner
equilibrium of n1f = 0. 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
At φ = 0, by using Eqs. (A4) and (A5), we solve η1h ≡ n1hn1h+n1f = λ. Meanwhile, total
differentiating Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A1) - (A3) w.r.t. φ and plugging Eqs. (A4), (A5) into
it, using the definition of n1j, we derive
∂η1h
∂φ
∣∣
φ→0 = −(1− β)(2λ− 1) < 0. It implies that
at φ close to zero, we have η1h < λ. At φ = 1, in interior equilibrium, we solve
n1h =
β(k − σ + 1)[λ−H(1− λ)]
fk(1−H2) > 0, n2h =
(1− β)λ(1−H)− β(2λ− 1)H
1−H , (B1)
n1f =
β(k − σ + 1)(1− λ−Hλ)
fk(1−H2) , n2f =
(1− β)(1− λ)(1−H) + β(2λ− 1)H
1−H > 0,
(B2)
in which the positiveness of n2h and n1f is guaranteed by H < min{1−λλ , λ−βλλ−β(1−λ)}. By
the definition of η1h, we have η1h = λ+
H(2λ−1)
1−H > λ, at φ = 1. On the other hand, in the
case of corner equilibrium n1f = 0, for φ ∈ [φ], 1), we have η1h = 1 > λ by the definition
of η1h. In both the interior and corner equilibria, because of the continuity of η1h, there
exists a φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) at which η1h = λ. We have η1h < λ when φ is close to 0 and η1h > λ
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when φ is close to 1.
For the Industry 2, at φ = 0, we solve η2h ≡ n2hn2h+n2f = λ and
∂η2h
∂φ
∣∣
φ→0 = β(2λ−1) > 0.
Therefore, at φ close to zero, we have η2h > λ. At φ = 1, in interior equilibrium, η2h is
solved as
η2h =
(1−H)[λ− β(1− λ)]− β(2λ− 1)
(1−H)(1− β) < λ,
where the inequality is from λ > 1/2. Moreover, in the corner equilibrium, for φ ∈ [φ], 1),
we have n1f = 0 and n2f = 1− λ. Because n1h > 0, we have n2h < λ by Eq. (10), which
implies
η2h ≡ n2h
n2h + n2f
<
λ
λ+ (1− λ) = λ.
In both the interior and corner equilibria, because of the continuity of η2h, there exists a
φ† ∈ (0, 1) at which η2h = λ. We have η2h > λ when φ is close to 0 and η2h < λ when φ
is close to 1.
Moreover, total differentiating Eqs. (8) - (10) and (A1) - (A3) w.r.t. k and plugging
Eqs. (A4), (A5) into it, by the definition of nvh, we derive
∂η1h
∂k
∣∣∣∣
φ→0
= −H
k
(1− β)(2λ− 1)φ kσ−1 < 0 and ∂η2h
∂k
∣∣∣∣
φ→0
=
H
k
β(2λ− 1)φ kσ−1 > 0.
It implies that a smaller k brings to a higher η1h and a lower η2h when φ is close to zero.
On the other hand, at φ = 1, in the interior equilibrium, differentiating ηvh w.r.t. k yields
∂η1h
∂k
= −
(2λ− 1)H log
(
fx
f
)
(σ − 1)(1−H)2 < 0 and
∂η2h
∂k
=
(2λ− 1)βH log
(
fx
f
)
(1− β)(σ − 1)(1−H)2 > 0.
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In the corner equilibrium of n1f = 0, we have η1h = 1. By using Eq. (A9), we derive
∂η2h
∂k
=
β(1− λ)
k2(1− β) [Hλ(σ − 1 + k log (fx/f))− (1− λ)(σ − 1)] > 0,
where the inequality comes from k log (fx/f) > 0 and H > 1−λλ in corner equilibrium. 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 4
At φ = 0, we solve EX1(0) = EX2(0) = 0. At φ close to zero, we derive
EX ′1(φ)
∣∣
φ→0 =
LkαβσH(2λ− 1)
(σ − α)(σ − 1) φ
k−σ+1
σ−1 > 0, EX ′2(φ)
∣∣
φ→0 =
Lασ(1− β)(2λ− 1)
σ − α > 0,
which implies that the larger country is a net exporter of both industrial goods when
trade costs are close to the level of autarky.
On the other hand, at φ = 1, in the interior equilibrium, by plugging Eq. (B1), (B2)
into (11) and (12), we solve
EX1(1) =
LαβσH(2λ− 1)
(1−H)(σ − α) > 0 and EX2(1) = −
LαβσH(2λ− 1)
(1−H)(σ − α) < 0,
which implies that the larger country is a net exporter (importer) of Industry 1 (2) goods
when trade costs are close to the level of free trade. Furthermore, total differentiating
EX1(1) and EX2(1) w.r.t. k derives
∂EX1(1)
∂k
= −Lαβσ log(fx/f)H(2λ− 1)
(1−H)2(σ − 1)(σ − α) < 0,
∂EX2(1)
∂k
=
Lαβσ log(fx/f)H(2λ− 1)
(1−H)2(σ − 1)(σ − α) > 0,
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which means that, at φ = 1, a smaller k increases (decreases) the larger country’s net
exports of Industry 1 (2) goods when trade costs are close to the level of free trade. On
the other hand, in the corner equilibrium of n1f = 0, by plugging Eqs. (A8), (A9) into
(11) and (12), we solve
EX1(1) =
HkLαβλσ
kσ − αk − αβ(λ+Hλ− 1)(σ − 1) > 0 and
EX2(1) = −Lσαβ(1− λ) [k − (1− λ−Hλ)(σ − 1)]
k(σ − α) + αβ(1− λ−Hλ)(σ − 1) < 0,
where the inequalities come from k > 2 and H > 1−λ
λ
. Furthermore, we derive
∂EX1(1)
∂k
= − HLα
2β2 σλ(σ − 1)(Hλ− 1 + λ)
[k(α− σ)− αβ(1− λ−Hλ)(σ − 1)]2 < 0 and
∂EX2(1)
∂k
=
Lαβσ(1− λ)(σ − 1)[σ − α(1− β)](Hλ− 1 + λ)
[k(α− σ)− αβ(1− λ−Hλ)(σ − 1)]2 > 0,
where the inequalities come from H > 1−λ
λ
in the corner equilibrium. Therefore, the
results are robust in the corner equilibrium of n1f = 0. Meanwhile, at φ close to zero, we
derive
∂EX1(φ)
∂k
∣∣∣
φ→0
= −Lαβσ(2λ− 1)Hφ
k
σ−1
k(σ − α) < 0 and
∂EX2(φ)
∂k
∣∣∣
φ→0
=
Lαβσ(1− β)(2λ− 1)[αλ(2λ− 1) + σ − αλ]Hφ k+σ−1σ−1
λ(1− λ)(σ − α)2(k + σ − 1) > 0,
which imply that a smaller k increases (decreases) the larger country’s net exports of
Industry 1 (2) goods when trade costs are close to the level of autarky. 
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Online Appendix
1. Conditions of ensuring ϕ∗jx > ϕ
∗
j
In line with the empirical evidence that the exporting firms also serve the domestic market,
we derive the conditions of ensuring ϕ∗jx > ϕ
∗
j . First of all, as shown by Appendix A,
we have wh > wf for φ ∈ (0, 1) and, therefore, ϕ∗h > 0. Using Eq. (7), we derive a
necessary and sufficient condition wh/wf < (fx/f)
k−σ+1
k which ensures ϕ∗f to be a positive
real number. Second, we derive conditions that ensure ϕ∗hx > ϕ
∗
h and ϕ
∗
fx > ϕ
∗
f . Note
that ϕ∗h < ϕ
∗
f , as aforementioned, the countries with higher wages have a lower cutoff
productivity level. From the mirror expression of Eq. (4), wh > wf and fx > f imply
ϕ∗hx > ϕ
∗
f > ϕ
∗
h. By Eq. (4), we also have ϕ
∗
hx > ϕ
∗
fx because of ϕ
∗
f > ϕ
∗
h and wh > wf .
To ensure ϕ∗fx > ϕ
∗
f , by using Eq. (7), the sufficient and necessary condition is derived
as wh
wf
<
(
fx
f
)[
H(fx/f)
k
1−σ τ−k+1
τ−k+fx/f
]σ−1
k
<
(
fx
f
) k−σ+1
k
, where the second inequality comes from
1 > H > 0. Therefore, wh
wf
<
(
fx
f
)[
H(fx/f)
k
1−σ τ−k+1
τ−k+fx/f
]σ−1
k
is the sufficient and necessary
condition to ensure ϕ∗hx > ϕ
∗
fx > ϕ
∗
f > ϕ
∗
h.
2. Possibilities of corner equilibria
This section shows that n2h = 0, n2f = 0, and n1h = 0 are not reasonable corner equilibria.
Since closed-form solutions are not available here, we show it by numerical experiments.
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2.1 n2h = 0
Eq. (9) can be rearranged as
N2h ≡
(
p1−σ2hh Yh
P 1−σ2h
+ φ
p1−σ2hh Yf
P 1−σ2f
)
α(1− β)− σwh.
Plugging Eqs. (4) - (6) and n2h = 0 into (8), (10), (A1) - (A3), and N2h, the threshold
value of φ] is defined as the trade freeness at which N2h = 0 holds. Although φ
] is not
tractable, numerical experiment shows that we always have n1f < 0 at φ
], as shown by
Fig. 5. Therefore, n2h = 0 is not a reasonable corner equilibrium.
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(a) σ = 4, Solid: k = 4, Dotted: k = 6, DotDashed: k = 8
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(b) k = 7, Solid: σ = 4, Dotted: σ = 5, DotDashed: σ = 6
Figure 5: N2h and n1f w.r.t. φ.
2.2 n2f = 0
Eq. (A2) can be rearranged as
N2f ≡
(
p1−σ2ff Yf
P 1−σ2f
+ φ
p1−σ2ff Yh
P 1−σ2h
)
α(1− β)− σwf .
Plugging Eqs. (4) - (6) and n2f = 0 into (8) - (10), (A1), (A3), and N2f , the threshold
value of φ] is defined as the trade freeness at which N2f = 0 holds. Although φ
] is not
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tractable, numerical experiment shows that such φ] ∈ (0, 1) does not exist, as shown by
Fig. 6. Therefore, n2f = 0 is not a reasonable corner equilibrium.
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σ = 8
Figure 6: N2f w.r.t. φ.
2.3 n1h = 0
Eq. (8) can be rearranged as
N1h ≡ n1h
(
ϕ˜h
ϕ∗h
)σ−1
σfwh + n1f
(
ϕ∗f
ϕ∗fx
)k(
ϕ˜fx
ϕ∗fx
)σ−1
σfxwf − Yhαβ.
Plugging Eqs. (4) - (6) and n1h = 0 into (9), (10), (A1) - (A3), and N1h, the threshold
value of φ] is defined as the trade freeness at which N1h = 0 holds. Although φ
] is not
tractable, numerical experiment shows that we always have n2f < 0 at φ
], as shown by
Fig. 7. Therefore, n1h = 0 is not a reasonable corner equilibrium.
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Figure 7: N1h and n2f w.r.t. φ.
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